CoreLogic®

The MarketPulse

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Data as of August 2013

Inside News

Housing Statistics (August 2013)

HPI® YOY Chg	12.4%
HPI YOY Chg XD	11.2%
NegEq Share (Q1 2013)	14.5%
Shadow Inventory (04/2013)	1.9m
Distressed Discount	43.3%
New Sales (ths, ann.)	416
Existing Sales (ths, ann.)	4,616
Average Sales Price	$261,227
HPI Peak-to-Current (PTC)	–17.1%
Foreclosure Stock PTC	–39.8%

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A Rising Market Lifts Fraud Boats

By Mark Fleming

IN THIS ARTICLE:

- The propensity for fraud is declining from its peak in 2012
- The mortgage application fraud risk index is down 5.6 percent in the second quarter of 2013 compared to a year ago
- The estimated dollar value of fraudulent applications increases as loan applications and rising application loan amounts increase, even if the index remains unchanged

Recent analysis for the latest CoreLogic Mortgage Fraud Report revealed some interesting trends in fraud across the United States. The headline, of course, is that the mortgage application fraud risk index is down 5.6 percent in the second quarter of 2013 compared to a year ago. Meanwhile, an estimated $5.3 billion in fraudulent mortgage applications were submitted to mortgage lenders in the second quarter, up about $100 million from the first quarter of 2013. Superficially, it may seem that these two indicators are at odds with each other, but the index measures the propensity for fraudulent applications independent of the size of the mortgage market or changes in the prices of homes. The estimated dollar value of fraudulent applications increases as loan applications and rising application loan amounts increase, even if the index remains unchanged. Not so incongruent after all.

While the mortgage market for purchase loans continues to grow slowly, the curtailment of the refinance market was not readily apparent in application volumes in the second quarter. Additionally, as home price gains were realized in the first half of the year, increased home sale prices as well as loan application amounts followed suit. Therefore, the growth in second-quarter total estimated dollar value of fraudulent loan applications is largely due to a rising market lifting all boats, including the number and size of fraudulent loan applications. As third- and fourth-quarter mortgage fraud loan application trends become apparent, it is quite possible that the total estimated dollar value of fraudulent applications will have decreased relative to the second quarter as a result of refinance application volumes experiencing a large drop-off.

Housing market dynamics have a role in shifting fraud types as well. The increase

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Congratulations

to Dr. Robert J. Shiller, Co-Founder of the Case-Shiller Indexes, for being named as the Recipient of Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.

TABLE 1. TOP 25 LARGEST MARKETS BY HIGHEST PROPENSITY FOR MORTGAGE FRAUD

CBSA	Year-Over-Year Growth Rate	Peak to Current	CBSA Rank (# Fraudulent Applications per 1000)	2013 Q2 Est. Fraudulent Applications ($, ths)	2013 Q1 Est. Fraudulent Applications ($, ths)
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA	-12.3%	-19.7%	1	$116,531	$132,109
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL	-7.5%	-26.4%	2	$90,873	$76,669
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL	-0.5%	-20.1%	3	$35,127	$34,317
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	-19.8%	-40.3%	4	$67,084	$72,484
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	-16.9%	-18.5%	5	$225,502	$236,137
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX	-4.2%	-10.0%	6	$74,984	$66,495
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ	-33.1%	-35.5%	7	$58,438	$61,194
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI	-12.0%	-35.2%	8	$50,665	$40,194
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	-3.3%	-5.9%	9	$337,004	$327,501
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX	-1.7%	-19.2%	10	$25,158	$27,029
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA	-3.9%	-6.4%	11	$155,819	$158,066
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA	-11.9%	-14.8%	12	$90,224	$86,400
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO	-9.9%	-17.8%	13	$62,521	$57,129
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC	-9.9%	-12.0%	14	$31,835	$31,809
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	-6.3%	-15.5%	15	$75,786	$69,291
Baltimore-Towson, MD	-3.9%	-6.8%	16	$54,596	$50,236
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA	-16.5%	-16.5%	17	$87,678	$83,626
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI	-0.1%	-8.1%	18	$159,478	$142,257
St. Louis, MO-IL	8.3%	-8.8%	19	$38,832	$31,124
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA	-1.9%	-9.4%	20	$338,813	$305,138
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA	-15.2%	-17.9%	21	$38,289	$39,696
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD	-0.9%	-11.3%	22	$69,976	$66,493
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH	8.2%	-0.6%	23	$85,791	$77,453
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI	-14.5%	-14.5%	24	$52,423	$52,706
Pittsburgh, PA	-3.5%	-33.7%	25	$13,478	$12,863

Source: CoreLogic Q2 2013

in home prices earlier this year, combined with consistent application of underwriting standards associated with a borrower's ability to pay, may explain the trend away from property-related fraud to income-based fraud. Where is the need to fraudulently inflate the value of the home on a loan application when home values are increasing so much on their own accord? Conversely, with the implementation of the ability-to-pay standards for the Qualified Mortgage rule and a focus by underwriters on ensuring that adequate income is available to support the mortgage payment, fraudulently claiming the necessary income to support the loan application may be more likely. Expressing it in slightly starker terms, times have changed from past periods when underwriters didn't see income as a reason for declining the loan application in the first place. Now underwriters do care, and they care greatly, about the borrower's ability to pay back the loan.

Beyond the national trends, local market-level data provides an interesting view of differences in mortgage application fraud risk across the country. In the Mortgage Fraud Report, 75 large metropolitan markets were ranked based on the number of fraudulent applications per 1000. Of the largest 25 markets, the highest propensity for mortgage application fraud by this measure is found in Atlanta, Ga., Miami, Fla., Tampa, Fla. and Riverside, Calif. (Table 1). Pittsburgh, Pa. and Minneapolis, Minn., are the least risky.

The risk of fraud continues to exist and persist in many markets and the illegitimate gains that can be made on mortgage application fraud make this vice attractive. While the propensity for fraud is declining from its peak in 2012, the overall amount is increasing as mortgage loan applications increase. An estimated $10.5 billion of fraudulent mortgage applications were submitted to mortgage lenders in the first half of 2013, but diligent underwriting staffs and technology used today likely prevented many of those applications from becoming real loans.

End.

Decline in Negative Equity Accelerates in First Half of 2013

By Sam Khater

IN THIS ARTICLE:

- Every state's level of negative equity has declined, with the biggest improvements concentrated in the states with the most home price appreciation
- Home price improvement in the first half of the year is rapidly lifting the lid off negative equity for borrowers

It is well chronicled that home prices are rapidly rising, in excess of 12 percent from a year ago as of July 2013 according to the CoreLogic® national HPI®. This is not just discernible in price data, but in a myriad other data that respond to or drive rapid price appreciation as well, such as a massive drop in the foreclosure rate, very tight supply of unsold homes, increases in property tax revenue bases for municipalities and, most recently, a rapid decline in the number of underwater borrowers.

In the second quarter of 2013, the share of borrowers in negative equity fell to 14.5 percent, or 7.1 million borrowers, down from 19.7 percent, or 9.6 million borrowers, in the first quarter of 2013. The most recent peak in the negative equity share was the fourth quarter of 2011, when the negative equity share was 25.2 percent, or 12.1 million borrowers. Since then, the negative equity share has dropped 10.7 percentage points from 25.2 percent to 14.5 percent, while the number of underwater borrowers has dropped from 12.1 million to 7.1 million (Figure 1).

The bulk of the decline in negative equity has been confined to the first half of this year when home prices increased 10 percent. While every state's negative equity level has

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FIGURE 1. NEGATIVE EQUITY DECLINES DUE TO PRICE INCREASES



Source: CoreLogic Q2 2013

FIGURE 2. STATES WITH MOST IMPROVEMENTS IN NEGATIVE EQUITY



Source: CoreLogic Q2 2013

improved, the biggest gains have been concentrated in the states with the most appreciation. Nevada improved the most, with the negative equity share falling from 52.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 to 36.4 percent in the second quarter of 2013. Nevada was followed closely by Georgia, where the negative equity share fell from 34.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 to 20.7 percent in the second quarter of 2013 (Figure 2). The improvements have been so robust that, as of the second quarter of 2013, 21 states have negative equity below 10 percent versus just 11 states as of the fourth quarter of 2012.

"The bulk of the decline in negative equity has been confined to the first half of this year when home prices increased 10 percent."

Though negative equity has improved over time and geographically, there are other dimensions in which it remains concentrated. As of the second quarter of 2013, borrowers with junior liens had a negative equity share of 27.8 percent compared to 11.1 percent for those with only one mortgage. It's even more concentrated when analyzing the impact of junior liens and value. As of the second quarter of 2013, more than 52 percent of properties valued at less than $100,000 that have a junior lien are in negative equity.

Rapid price improvement in the first half of the year is helping to lift the lid off of many upside-down borrowers, but negative equity remains entrenched for borrowers with junior liens and lower-valued properties. Going forward, we expect prices to increase 6 percent over the next 12 months, which would mean that negative equity should continue to improve, though at a much more moderate pace of roughly 4 to 5 percentage points over the next year.

End.

In the News

Reuters, *October 10*

Rising number of US homes at risk from wildfires

The number of homes at risk from wildfires in western U.S. states jumped 62 percent in the past year as more properties were developed in fire-prone areas, according to a CoreLogic report released on Thursday.

World Property Channel, *October 8*

US Shadow Inventory Reaches Five-Year Low

The overall "shadow inventory" of distressed and foreclosed properties not listed for sale in July reached its lowest level since August 2008, according to latest report from CoreLogic.

HousingWire, *October 8*

Completed foreclosures fall 34%

Completed foreclosures dropped 34% year-over-year in August 2013, according to data from CoreLogic (CLGX).

ABC News, *October 4*

Top 10 US Markets by Price Gains in August

U.S. home prices surged 12.4 percent in August from a year earlier, according to real estate data provider CoreLogic.

International Business Times, *October 1*

US Housing Prices On The Rise In Every State, Up 12.4%

US home prices are on the rise in almost all major cities, and up 12.4 percent from last August, according to the CoreLogic Home Price Index (HPI) report.

Mortgageorb, *October 1*

Home Prices Rise 0.9% In August, Up 12.4% From Last Year

U.S. home prices, including distressed sales, increased 0.9% in August compared to July and were up 12.4% compared to July 2012, according to CoreLogic's Home Price Index (HPI).

Sometimes Contagion Is Good News

By Molly Boesel and Katie Dobbyn

IN THIS ARTICLE:

- Foreclosures fell in most metropolitan areas in August

The number of homes in foreclosure nationally has been declining on a year-over-year basis since November 2011, and the August 2013 year-over-year decrease of 33 percent was the largest since the start of the housing crisis. This decrease in the number of homes in foreclosure is positive news for the housing market, but national numbers don't tell the entire story of housing market improvements. Improvements could be driven by large increases in just a few areas of the country, or could be driven by increases in many areas.

The chart on this page shows a year-over-year change in the number of homes in foreclosure for census-designated metropolitan areas[1]. The line in the graph shows the mean of the year-over-year percent change in the number of foreclosures for all metropolitan areas. At the height of the housing crisis, metropolitan-area foreclosures were increasing at an average rate of more than 90 percent year over year, and, as of August 2013, were decreasing at a rate of 27 percent year over year. The shaded area on the graph shows the share of the metropolitan areas that have decreasing year-over-year foreclosure inventories. When the crisis was at its worst, less than 1 percent of metropolitan areas had falling foreclosure inventories, meaning that foreclosures were rising in almost every metropolitan area across the country. In August 2013, foreclosure inventories were falling in 96 percent of the metropolitan areas, showing that the mending of the housing market is spreading to most areas. Which metropolitan areas are improving the most? Yuba City, Calif., leads metropolitan-area declines with a 62 percent year-over-year decrease, followed closely by Phoenix (-60 percent) and Merced, Calif. (-59 percent).

FORECLOSURES FELL IN MOST METROPOLITAN AREAS IN AUGUST



Source: CoreLogic September 2013

End.

Footnote

[1] A metropolitan area contains a core urban population of 50,000 or more. The chart was created using 384 metropolitan areas.

NATIONAL SUMMARY AUGUST 2013

	Sep 2012	Oct 2012	Nov 2012	Dec 2012	Jan 2013	Feb 2013	Mar 2013	Apr 2013	May 2013	Jun 2013	Jul 2013	Aug 2013	2010	2011	2012
Total Sales*	4,215	4,607	4,311	4,240	3,469	3,600	4,451	5,160	5,796	5,660	5,972	5,948	4,177	4,046	4,429
— New Sales*	318	338	334	342	256	269	324	339	373	371	398	416	347	302	323
— Existing Sales*	2,969	3,222	2,934	2,936	2,352	2,469	3,174	3,795	4,393	4,355	4,634	4,616	2,702	2,638	3,057
— REO Sales*	517	586	629	546	534	526	570	599	581	512	490	475	803	762	636
— Short Sales*	380	424	378	385	300	310	353	395	420	395	420	410	275	304	376
Distressed Sales Share	21.3%	21.9%	23.4%	22.0%	24.1%	23.2%	20.7%	19.3%	17.3%	16.0%	15.2%	14.9%	25.8%	26.3%	22.8%
HPI MoM	-0.1%	-0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.3%	2.1%	2.7%	2.6%	1.8%	1.5%	0.9%	-0.3%	-0.2%	0.7%
HPI YoY	5.6%	6.3%	7.6%	8.8%	9.4%	10.0%	10.9%	11.5%	11.8%	11.6%	11.9%	12.4%	-0.4%	-4.1%	3.8%
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed	-0.2%	-0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.6%	0.6%	1.8%	2.1%	2.0%	1.4%	1.3%	1.0%	-0.3%	-0.3%	0.5%
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed	3.5%	4.3%	5.5%	6.5%	7.5%	8.5%	9.5%	10.1%	10.4%	10.2%	10.6%	11.2%	-1.5%	-3.8%	1.7%
90 Days + DQ Pct	6.7%	6.5%	6.5%	6.4%	6.4%	6.2%	6.0%	5.8%	5.6%	5.6%	5.4%	5.3%	8.1%	7.4%	6.8%
Foreclosure Pct	3.2%	3.1%	3.0%	3.0%	2.9%	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	2.6%	2.5%	2.4%	2.4%	3.2%	3.5%	3.3%
REO Pct	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%
Pre-foreclosure Filings**	117	123	104	95	101	92	92	98	91	80	88	92	2,106	1,526	1,461
Completed Foreclosures**	83	68	64	51	57	49	50	52	45	44	47	48	1139	926	815
Negative Equity Share	22.0%	N/A	N/A	21.7%	N/A	N/A	19.7%	N/A	N/A	14.5%	N/A	N/A	25.3%	24.9%	22.7%
Negative Equity**	10,574	N/A	N/A	10,509	N/A	N/A	9,614	N/A	N/A	7,065	N/A	N/A	11,904	11,820	10,942
Months Supply Distressed Homes	6.59	7.93	7.05	7.45	7.48	9.05	8.41	6.24	5.37	4.61	4.53	4.70	10.23	9.55	7.90

*Thousands of Units, Annualized **Thousands of Units †August Data

LARGEST 25 CBSA SUMMARY AUGUST 2013

	Total Sales 12-month sum	Total Sales YOY 12-month sum	Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)	Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum) A Year Ago	SFC HPI YoY	SFCXD HPI YoY	HPI Percent Change from Peak	90 Days + DQ Pct	Stock of 90+ Delinquencies YoY Chg	Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak	Negative Equity Share**	Months' Supply Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg.)
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL	105,213	31.7%	33.3%	35.8%	7.8%	10.3%	-24.9%	8.2%	-25.3%	-45.2%	23.1%	11.1
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA	93,515	7.2%	23.2%	38.7%	22.5%	19.5%	-19.8%	3.7%	-42.3%	-70.1%	11.4%	5.4
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA	91,472	28.1%	27.3%	37.3%	16.9%	14.2%	-13.6%	5.5%	-32.1%	-51.4%	23.5%	6.6
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ	72,554	13.2%	9.0%	9.7%	8.8%	9.1%	-6.2%	8.2%	-11.2%	-17.4%	8.5%	12.3
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	70,550	12.9%	16.2%	22.7%	9.0%	8.7%	-15.5%	4.6%	-21.4%	-32.9%	16.3%	6.3
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX	116,526	13.9%	14.4%	18.8%	11.3%	12.2%	0.0%	3.5%	-23.1%	-42.1%	4.8%	2.8
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ	107,693	0.1%	13.6%	36.2%	17.9%	15.0%	-32.6%	2.7%	-52.4%	-85.8%	25.6%	2.0
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	74,811	1.3%	31.6%	49.1%	23.4%	22.3%	-38.1%	4.9%	-44.6%	-79.3%	24.8%	4.9
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX	86,472	14.0%	15.1%	19.6%	10.2%	10.6%	0.0%	3.7%	-21.0%	-31.9%	5.0%	3.1
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI	57,050	26.3%	16.7%	22.8%	9.6%	9.3%	-16.5%	2.9%	-32.4%	-64.9%	13.3%	3.6
Philadelphia, PA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.4%	4.8%	-10.1%	5.5%	-8.0%	-16.8%	6.6%	N/A
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA	45,981	24.7%	17.4%	24.8%	15.5%	14.6%	-14.6%	4.5%	-34.2%	-33.4%	8.2%	5.6
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO	62,956	25.4%	15.1%	25.8%	10.6%	9.5%	0.0%	2.3%	-39.0%	-67.4%	9.2%	2.0
Baltimore-Towson, MD	36,164	14.4%	18.4%	17.7%	5.7%	6.8%	-17.7%	7.3%	-11.2%	-19.6%	12.7%	10.6
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA	45,932	13.3%	22.7%	38.1%	22.4%	18.8%	-20.2%	2.8%	-48.0%	-76.0%	13.7%	3.2
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA	37,500	14.3%	16.8%	33.1%	23.0%	20.3%	-17.0%	2.3%	-51.7%	-72.6%	6.7%	3.1
St. Louis, MO-IL	47,284	4.3%	25.6%	27.2%	7.5%	8.3%	-12.2%	3.8%	-19.4%	-47.1%	10.6%	4.1
Nassau-Suffolk, NY	25,073	7.4%	7.0%	6.0%	3.8%	4.4%	-20.7%	10.2%	-8.5%	-13.0%	7.7%	20.5
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA	38,387	4.7%	22.8%	41.9%	28.5%	21.6%	-20.6%	2.8%	-48.8%	-76.6%	15.7%	3.7
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL	68,540	20.7%	28.5%	28.5%	12.7%	14.5%	-35.9%	13.0%	-27.6%	-37.8%	33.8%	9.5
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.3%	14.0%	-22.6%	3.3%	-36.1%	-73.8%	24.3%	N/A
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA	38,601	22.2%	16.0%	26.4%	15.5%	13.5%	-13.4%	4.4%	-23.2%	-24.5%	8.1%	5.1
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA	41,213	5.5%	29.5%	50.0%	26.1%	22.7%	-32.8%	3.3%	-49.1%	-77.0%	18.1%	3.5
Edison-New Brunswick, NJ	28,481	14.8%	12.3%	12.0%	3.3%	3.6%	-22.8%	9.0%	-7.2%	-18.0%	13.0%	13.2
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL	50,966	13.5%	33.8%	38.1%	15.6%	15.3%	-39.7%	12.4%	-32.2%	-45.6%	35.7%	9.8

NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions.
** Negative Equity Data through Q2 2013

†August Data

STATE SUMMARY AUGUST 2013

State	Total Sales 12-month sum	Total Sales YOY 12-month sum	Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)	Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum) A Year Ago	SFC HPI YoY	SFCXD HPI YoY	HPI Percent Change from Peak	90 Days+ DQ Pct	Stock of 90+ Delinquencies YoY Chg	Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak	Negative Equity Share**	Months' Supply Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg.)
Alabama	47,073	30.7%	19.6%	15.5%	3.5%	5.0%	-13.7%	5.0%	-11.9%	-38.3%	10.4%	6.8
Alaska	11,579	9.6%	10.9%	11.3%	5.6%	6.3%	0.0%	1.8%	-20.6%	-32.0%	3.9%	1.5
Arizona	149,342	2.6%	21.8%	35.6%	16.4%	14.0%	-31.9%	2.9%	-47.5%	-81.9%	24.8%	2.3
Arkansas	41,636	-2.9%	9.7%	7.8%	2.8%	4.2%	-0.7%	5.3%	-6.9%	-34.1%	8.3%	4.3
California	500,366	5.6%	24.9%	41.7%	23.1%	19.8%	-22.2%	3.3%	-45.6%	-74.6%	15.4%	4.1
Colorado	120,129	19.9%	16.4%	25.4%	9.6%	8.8%	0.0%	2.4%	-37.0%	-65.3%	9.5%	2.0
Connecticut	40,786	15.0%	18.6%	19.2%	3.7%	5.7%	-19.5%	6.9%	-11.9%	-19.6%	10.9%	9.3
Delaware	11,225	5.7%	16.9%	21.1%	2.5%	5.2%	-15.4%	6.3%	-9.6%	-21.3%	12.3%	10.3
District of Columbia	8,353	15.8%	5.6%	8.8%	7.8%	7.8%	-0.3%	5.1%	-12.0%	-24.1%	6.0%	6.9
Florida	484,360	15.0%	27.6%	29.9%	12.7%	13.5%	-37.2%	12.4%	-30.3%	-44.8%	31.5%	8.5
Georgia	143,734	20.1%	24.3%	31.3%	14.8%	12.5%	-13.5%	5.3%	-28.7%	-48.6%	20.7%	6.1
Hawaii	18,183	14.5%	10.9%	17.3%	13.8%	12.2%	-8.3%	5.5%	-19.6%	-20.1%	6.0%	6.0
Idaho	39,748	14.3%	15.2%	24.1%	13.2%	12.5%	-19.0%	3.7%	-24.3%	-40.1%	11.6%	2.5
Illinois	169,305	20.6%	28.6%	28.2%	6.5%	7.8%	-22.6%	7.1%	-24.4%	-44.4%	20.1%	8.9
Indiana	129,952	18.3%	17.4%	19.3%	4.7%	5.7%	-6.9%	5.2%	-20.5%	-42.4%	6.6%	3.9
Iowa	50,013	5.3%	8.6%	9.2%	3.4%	3.8%	0.0%	3.3%	-16.5%	-33.3%	7.8%	2.7
Kansas	38,652	15.1%	16.3%	15.9%	4.3%	7.2%	-3.9%	3.5%	-18.6%	-44.0%	6.3%	3.3
Kentucky	48,675	-3.6%	15.6%	13.4%	2.7%	4.0%	-4.5%	4.6%	-17.7%	-40.7%	7.5%	4.8
Louisiana	55,223	1.2%	14.2%	14.3%	4.2%	4.8%	0.0%	5.1%	-15.0%	-42.8%	13.4%	4.9
Maine	16,459	29.7%	9.0%	9.5%	4.3%	0.7%	-11.8%	6.8%	-9.4%	-14.9%	5.6%	7.0
Maryland	77,683	12.7%	20.7%	21.9%	7.0%	7.6%	-21.3%	7.3%	-13.5%	-22.7%	17.3%	11.1
Massachusetts	96,292	11.3%	5.9%	12.4%	12.4%	10.2%	-9.5%	4.9%	-13.4%	-31.7%	11.6%	5.2
Michigan	170,248	5.4%	35.0%	34.5%	12.3%	12.1%	-25.7%	4.0%	-30.2%	-68.3%	22.5%	3.6
Minnesota	81,113	10.9%	14.9%	18.8%	8.1%	7.9%	-15.0%	2.9%	-29.4%	-63.5%	12.6%	3.6
Mississippi	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.1%	4.6%	-8.7%	6.1%	-16.1%	-46.3%	N/A	N/A
Missouri	90,570	4.0%	23.1%	25.2%	7.5%	7.7%	-12.0%	3.5%	-20.1%	-50.4%	10.3%	3.5
Montana	16,141	13.1%	12.9%	15.3%	8.3%	5.8%	-6.6%	2.1%	-25.0%	-57.4%	3.8%	2.0
Nebraska	33,847	3.3%	8.6%	9.4%	4.8%	4.6%	0.0%	2.3%	-18.5%	-43.9%	8.1%	1.7
Nevada	67,985	-6.2%	36.3%	50.7%	25.9%	23.3%	-41.9%	8.6%	-32.9%	-63.0%	36.4%	6.5
New Hampshire	20,435	15.2%	20.3%	24.5%	5.1%	4.1%	-16.6%	3.5%	-21.0%	-47.0%	14.2%	3.8
New Jersey	92,549	12.5%	14.1%	14.5%	5.0%	5.2%	-22.1%	10.8%	-7.3%	-17.4%	14.9%	16.7
New Mexico	27,892	14.1%	16.9%	16.9%	1.5%	3.7%	-18.5%	4.9%	-18.3%	-28.0%	11.9%	5.1
New York	161,958	5.2%	6.4%	6.0%	9.6%	10.0%	-4.4%	8.0%	-8.0%	-13.1%	6.1%	10.7
North Carolina	139,727	18.0%	14.8%	15.1%	5.7%	7.3%	-5.0%	4.4%	-22.0%	-46.2%	7.9%	5.0
North Dakota	14,096	-2.6%	3.2%	3.7%	11.0%	7.0%	0.0%	1.2%	-20.2%	-22.2%	4.5%	0.6
Ohio	172,981	16.4%	23.2%	24.9%	3.3%	5.2%	-12.2%	5.6%	-21.0%	-41.4%	18.8%	5.3
Oklahoma	81,461	13.6%	9.6%	10.5%	3.6%	4.0%	0.0%	4.7%	-12.7%	-29.8%	5.7%	2.5
Oregon	64,342	17.8%	16.2%	26.7%	14.0%	12.2%	-15.0%	4.7%	-18.2%	-21.7%	10.2%	5.2
Pennsylvania	155,849	11.1%	12.9%	12.2%	4.1%	4.8%	-7.3%	5.6%	-7.3%	-16.9%	7.3%	6.1
Rhode Island	12,866	4.4%	19.5%	24.1%	4.8%	5.5%	-29.1%	6.8%	-12.9%	-36.5%	18.8%	7.9
South Carolina	76,478	15.7%	20.2%	21.9%	8.1%	7.7%	-7.0%	5.0%	-21.6%	-37.2%	10.5%	4.9
South Dakota	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9.6%	9.7%	0.0%	1.9%	-21.5%	-43.9%	N/A	N/A
Tennessee	121,671	10.0%	19.4%	20.4%	6.7%	7.1%	-4.5%	4.7%	-19.8%	-54.2%	10.4%	3.4
Texas	478,487	11.7%	13.4%	16.4%	9.1%	9.9%	0.0%	3.5%	-19.7%	-34.2%	4.3%	2.5
Utah	60,063	13.7%	13.4%	22.5%	12.3%	13.7%	-14.9%	3.4%	-26.1%	-55.8%	8.1%	2.8
Vermont	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.1%	2.6%	-0.7%	3.9%	-9.0%	-18.3%	N/A	N/A
Virginia	113,156	9.5%	17.1%	21.8%	7.5%	7.2%	-14.9%	3.2%	-20.5%	-53.2%	12.1%	4.2
Washington	107,438	21.3%	18.1%	23.6%	12.5%	12.5%	-15.8%	5.1%	-26.3%	-25.1%	10.0%	6.3
West Virginia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.6%	5.6%	-22.3%	3.3%	-15.2%	-44.3%	N/A	N/A
Wisconsin	92,807	19.3%	14.0%	16.1%	4.2%	4.5%	-10.7%	3.3%	-24.3%	-54.1%	12.2%	3.2
Wyoming	8,814	28.6%	11.3%	13.1%	15.0%	8.3%	0.0%	1.8%	-16.8%	-62.3%	4.2%	1.7

NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions.
** Negative Equity Data through Q2 2013

†August Data

Home Prices

- Home prices barely increased month over month in August, an expected decrease in the pace of appreciation as housing entered the off-season. Including distressed sales, home prices increased by 0.9 percent month over month and 12.4 percent year over year in August 2013. This change represents the 18th consecutive monthly year-over-year increase in home prices nationally. Excluding distressed sales, home prices increased on a year-over-year basis by 11.2 percent. On a month-over-month basis, excluding distressed sales, home prices increased 1 percent in August 2013. Distressed sales include short sales and real estate owned (REO) transactions.
- Including distressed sales, the five states with the highest home price appreciation were: Nevada (+25.9 percent), California (+23.1 percent), Arizona (+16.4 percent), Wyoming (+15 percent) and Georgia (+14.8 percent). Excluding distressed sales, the five states with the highest home price appreciation were: Nevada (+23.4 percent), California (+19.8 percent), Arizona (+14 percent), Utah (+13.7 percent) and Florida (+13.5 percent). All states plus the District of Columbia posted year-over-year home price appreciation in August for both the HPI® including distressed sales and the HPI excluding distressed sales.

HOME PRICE INDEX



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

YoY HPI GROWTH FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

HPI BY PRICE SEGMENT



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

PRICE-TO-INCOME RATIO



Source: CoreLogic, BEA August 2013

DISTRESSED SALES DISCOUNT



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

Mortgage Performance

- As of August 2013, approximately 939,000 homes in the U.S. were in some stage of foreclosure, known as the foreclosure inventory, compared to 1.4 million in August 2012, a year-over-year decrease of 33 percent. Month over month, the foreclosure inventory was down 3.2 percent from July 2013 to August 2013. The foreclosure inventory as of August 2013 represented 2.4 percent of all homes with a mortgage compared to 3.3 percent in July 2012. For eight consecutive months, there has been at least a 20 percent year-over-year decline in the inventory of foreclosed homes nationwide.
- There were 48,000 completed foreclosures in the U.S. in August 2013, down from 72,000 in August 2012, a year-over-year decrease of 34 percent. On a month-over-month basis, completed foreclosures increased 1.3 percent from the 47,000 reported in July. As a basis of comparison, prior to the decline in the housing market in 2007, completed foreclosures averaged 21,000 per month nationwide between 2000 and 2006. Completed foreclosures are an indication of the total number of homes actually lost to foreclosure. Since the financial crisis began in September 2008, there have been approximately 4.5 million completed foreclosures across the country. The 12-month sum of completed foreclosures is at its lowest point since February 2008 and has declined every month for 20 consecutive months.

CONFORMING PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATE

By Origination Year



Source: CoreLogic July 2013

NATIONAL ACTIVE LOAN COUNT SHARE

By Current Interest Rate



Source: CoreLogic July 2013

SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES

Min, Max, Current since Jan 2000



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

OVERALL MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

PRE-FORECLOSURE FILINGS AND COMPLETED FORECLOSURES



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

Home Sales

- Total home sales increased by 16 percent year over year in August 2013. New home sales decreased by 14 percent from a year ago. Sales of previously owned homes soared 26 percent on a year-over-year basis and accounted for 78 percent of all home sales in August 2013.
- Nationwide, the share of distressed sales accounted for 15 percent of all homes sales in August 2013, equaling the level from the previous month. Nationwide, REO sales accounted for 8 percent of all home sales in August 2013, a 25 percent year-over-year decrease. The share of distressed sales is at the lowest level since February 2008 and has decreased for eight consecutive months.

HOME SALES SHARE BY PRICE TIER

As a Percentage of Total Sales



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

NEW HOME SALES TRENDS

In Thousands

In Thousands



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES

Min, Max, Current



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

SALES BY SALE TYPE

Annualized In Millions



Source: CoreLogic August 2013

VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

Variable	Definition
Total Sales	The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.
Total Sales 12-month sum	The total number of all home-sale transactions for the last 12 months.
Total Sales YoY Change 12-month sum	Percentage increase or decrease in current 12 months of total sales over the prior 12 months of total sales
New Home Sales	The total number of newly constructed residential housing units sold during the month.
New Home Sales Median Price	The median price for newly constructed residential housing units during the month.
Existing Home Sales	The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. Does not include REO and short sales.
REO Sales	Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.
REO Sales Share	The number of REO Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
REO Price Discount	The average price of a REO divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
REO Pct	The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.
Short Sales	The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.
Short Sales Share	The number of Short Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
Short Sale Price Discount	The average price of a Short Sale divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
Short Sale Pct	The count of loans in Short Sale as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the month.
Distressed Sales Share	The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).
Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)	The sum of the REO Sales 12-month sum and the Short Sales 12-month sum divided by the total sales 12-month sum.
HPI MoM	Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.
HPI YoY	Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed	Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed	Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.
HPI Percent Change from Peak	Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series from the respective peak value in the index.
90 Days + DQ Pct	The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies YoY Chg	Percent change year-over-year of the number of 90+ day delinquencies in the current month.
Foreclosure Pct	The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.
Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak	Percent increase or decrease in the number of foreclosures from the respective peak number of foreclosures.
Pre-foreclosure Filings	The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).
Completed Foreclosures	A completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.
Negative Equity Share	The percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.
Negative Equity	The number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.
Months' Supply of Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg)	The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.
Price/Income Ratio	CoreLogic HPI™ divided by Nominal Personal Income provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and indexed to January 1976.
Conforming Prime Serious Delinquency Rate	The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are within the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Jumbo Prime Serious Delinquency Rate	The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are larger than the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).

Source: CoreLogic

FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 415-536-3500

17-MKTPLSE-1013-01

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